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Chapter 19 
Faking Countermeasure Against  
Side-Channel Attacks 
Rubén Lumbiarres-López, Mariano López-García  
and Enrique Cantó-Navarro1 
19.1. Introduction 
Any cryptographic device is susceptible to being fraudulently attacked for the purpose of 
obtaining the cryptographic key. Such a key is used to cipher or decipher confidential data 
that must be protected. Side-channel attacks (SCAs) were proposed by Paul Kocher et al. 
[1] at the end of the 1990s (they were known as differential analysis of power 
consumption). These attacks have become a powerful tool that is suitable for obtaining a 
cryptographic key in a short period of time using low-cost equipment. This equipment 
basically consists of a data-acquisition set, needed for capturing the current traces that 
represent the consumed power, and a desk computer that is used for processing the 
information contained in such traces. These attacks exploit the existing relationship 
between the energy consumed by an electronic device and the data that are being 
processed at a specific instant of time. As data are related with the cryptographic key, this 
analysis could potentially reveal the secret key.  
So far, techniques used by engineers to conceal the cryptographic key, usually known as 
countermeasures, are focused in two different ways: hiding and masking. The aim of 
hiding is to design systems whose power consumption is constant and independent of data. 
Yet, masking is intended for devices in which the consumed power depends not only on 
data, but also on a random mask that is unknown to the attacker. In both cases, the 
consumed power is not directly linked with the processed data, hence the secret key is 
safe. Although hiding and masking make a successful attack more difficult, the use of 
sophisticated algorithms, or the fact of including a high number of traces in the analysis, 
allows the attacker to breach the security of the system.  
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The countermeasure based on faking represents a paradigm shift towards the protection 
of cryptographic devices: the aim is not to design a non-vulnerable system, but to profit 
from the vulnerability of cryptographic devices in revealing a fake key when SCA analysis 
is performed.  
This chapter shows the theoretical basis for applying the faking countermeasure to the 
AES 128-bit cryptographic algorithm [2]. Initially, such an algorithm is analysed and its 
weak points for performing a successful SCA analysis are noted. Afterwards, several 
modifications are proposed and applied for implementing the proposed faking 
countermeasure. Experimental results were obtained for a software implementation using 
a Sasebo-GII [3] development board and the set of measures proposed in [4] by E. Oswald. 
19.2. Fundamentals 
The correlation and the differences-in-means are two of the main techniques used to reveal 
cryptographic keys by means of SCA analysis [4]. These kinds of attacks do not need any 
previous knowledge on the internal structure of the system; only the power consumption 
and the plain-text that is being encrypted need be known. Therefore, it is assumed that a 
number of T current traces, and their respective T plain-texts that are chosen by the 
attacker, are available to perform the analysis. A simple expression to know the minimum 
number of necessary traces can be found in [4]. 
The consumed power is measured when the device is executing a set of instructions related 
to a specific part of the cryptographic algorithm. Data related with such a selected set of 
instructions should have the property that only depends on a few bits of the cryptographic 
key. Hence, only a subset of the bits that form the key need to be analysed, which makes 
the processing easier. The attack is based on comparing the actual power consumption of 
the electronic device with a theoretical model. Such a model is used to predict the expected 
power that is consumed by the device. As this consumption depends on the key, the model 
is evaluated for every possible key whose bits may affect the power consumption. This is 
the reason why subsets of 8 bits are chosen, which reduces the number of guessed 
hypotheses to 256. The hypothesis whose theoretical model has the higher similarity with 
the actual power consumed will be the real key [5, 6]. The Hamming weight (HW) and 
the Hamming distance (HD) are the most used power models [4]. The Hamming weight 
corresponds to the number of bits set to 1 (or zero) in the data that are being analysed. The 
Hamming distance is the difference between the number of bits set to 1 (or zero) at two 
consecutive instants of time t1 and t2, respectively. For instance HW(11010001) = 4, 
whereas HD(11010001, 01011001) = 2. 
These attacks are known as first order attacks, because they are focused on a particular 
point related to a specific instant of time. Second order attacks are more sophisticated, 
because they are based on processing the power consumption of two points that may take 
place in two different instants of time. Additionally, second order attacks are able to 
eliminate the protection provided by masking using a simple logical operation. Indeed, let 
u and v be two sets of bits that should be masked by using mask m. Then, this operation 
could be performed as follows: 
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 ݑ௠ 	ൌ 	ݑ ⊕݉ܽ݊݀ݒ௠ 	ൌ 	ݒ ⊕݉, (19.1) 
where um and vm are the masked values associated with the intermediate points u and v, 
and ⊕  represents the bit-wise logical exclusive-OR operator. Assuming that the 
Hamming weight model is accurate for predicting the real power consumption, from 
(19.1) the following expression could be obtained as: 
 ܪܹሺݑ௠ ⊕ ݒ௠ሻ 	ൌ 	ܪܹሺݑ ⊕݉⊕ ݒ⊕݉ሻ 	ൌ 	ܪܹሺݑ ⊕ ݒሻ. (19.2) 
As can be seen, the effect of the mask is removed, since the HW for both masking and 
non-masking data are identical. Now, the system is potentially vulnerable, because the 
attacker knows the values of u and v (such values depend on the plain-text) and therefore 
the attacker is capable of predicting the theoretical power consumed by the device.  
The following step is to find a suitable function for processing the power consumed by 
the pair values (um,vm) produced at the instants of time (Cti,Ctk), respectively. Such a 
function should have a significant degree of correlation with the model of power 
consumption described in (19.1). In [7], a function based on the absolute value of both 
points is proposed, represented by Eq. (19.3), but other authorspropose the use of 
products, the square of the sum or even the square of the absolute value [8, 4]. 
 ܨ௣௥௘ି௣௥௢௖௘௦௦௜௡௚ 	ൌ 	ܾܽݏሺܥ௧௜ െ ܥ௧௞ሻ. (19.3) 
The success of this process depends on the detailed knowledge held by the attacker of the 
instants of time in which points (Cti,Ctk) are produced. When such points are unknown, 
the process should be applied to all the pairs of values that arise from the combination of 
all possible points that form the current trace. Therefore, each processed trace consists in 
n! values, where n represents the number of points included in the original captured traces.  
19.2.1. AES Algorithm 
The AES 128-bit algorithm [2] consists of 4 basic functions (AddRoundKey, ShiftRows, 
SubBytes and MixColumns) that are executed sequentially during several rounds following 
the diagram shown in Fig. 19.1. The number of rounds depends on the key-length, being 
11 rounds (0 to 10) for the case of AES128-bit. The input and output of each function is 
a matrix of 4×4 bytes known as state. A basic description of these functions is as follows:  
AddRoundKey: It performs the exclusive-OR bit-wise operation between each byte of the 
state and each byte of the key (its output is StA).  
ShiftRows: This function makes a shift between the bytes that form the rows of the state 
(its output is StR).  
SubBytes: It makes a SBOX substitution, which is defined in the AES 128-bit algorithm. 
The most usual way for performing these operations is by using a look-up table that is 
stored in memory (its output is StB). 
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Fig. 19.1. AES algorithm structure. 
MixColumns: Each column of state is treated as a polynomial in a Galois finite field, 
GF(28). Each column is multiplied (modulus x4+1) with the fixed polynomial: 
 ܥሺݔሻ 	ൌ 	3ݔଷ ൅ ݔଶ ൅ ݔ ൅ 2, (19.4) 
or the polynomial: 
 ܥିଵሺݔሻ 	ൌ 	11ݔଷ ൅ 13ݔଶ ൅ 9ݔ ൅ 14, (19.5) 
when the cipher text is decrypted (the output of MixColumns is StM). 
KeyExpand: is another important function in the algorithm that only operates on the key. 
The key is subjected to an expansion process by which, starting with the original key, 
several keys of identical length are obtained. Each of these expanded keys are used in each 
of the 11 rounds performed during the execution of the AES128-bit algorithm. 
19.2.2. AES Vulnerabilities 
The fortress of the algorithm increases when the key is scattered through the matrix state. 
The Mixcolumns function performs efficiently the diffusion of the key, since after the first 
round each byte of the state at the output of MixColumns depends on both the 4 bytes of 
the key and the 4 bytes of the plain-text. This key dependence increases for each round.  
This effect can be appreciated in Table 19.1, which represents the variation of the values 
of the matrix state (bytes B0 to B15) during two rounds (R0 to R2) and in two different 
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cases. In the first case, a random plain-text was chosen. In the second case, the same text 
was used, but changing only the less significant bit of byte 15 in the key. The shadowed 
values represent changes in the state matrix. As can be seen, all bytes of state at the output 
of function MixColumns in round 2 have changed, so that from this point any value of 
state depends on the complete value of the key. 
Table 19.1. AES128-bit algorithm key dispersion. 
State bytes   
B0 B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 B7 B7 B8 B10 B11 B12 B13 B14 B15   
15 4 83 250 3 140 142 46 132 46 7 109 99 162 137 103 AdKey R0 
118 242 237 45 123 100 25 49 95 49 197 60 251 58 167 133 SBytes 
R1 118 100 197 133 123 49 167 45 95 58 237 49 251 242 25 60 SRow 0 111 23 42 47 198 104 65 44 54 247 84 197 19 127 133 MCol 
220 255 32 154 180 143 183 168 187 200 133 107 253 146 106 34 AdKey 
134 22 183 184 141 115 169 194 234 232 151 127 84 79 2 147 SBytes 
R2 134 115 151 147 141 232 2 184 234 79 183 194 84 22 169 127 SRow 134 81 110 72 152 248 178 13 107 116 141 66 68 231 138 189 MCol 
84 152 5 255 209 120 6 83 181 10 75 35 162 24 89 123 AdKey 
 
The conclusion is that the main vulnerability of the algorithm is found in rounds 0 and 1 
(it can be demonstrated that the same vulnerability arises in rounds 9 and 10) [5]. In these 
rounds the key is not scattered through the state and then it is more susceptible to attack. 
In the first round, the state at the output of AddRoundkey corresponds to the combination 
of the plain-text with the non-expanded original key. The operation performed is: 
 ܵݐ஺ሺ௜,௝ሻ 	ൌ 	 ሺܶ௜,௝ሻ ⊕	ܭሺ௜,௝ሻ, (19.6) 
where StA(i,j) (i = 1..4, j = 1..4) represents one of the 16 bytes that form the state, and T(i,j) 
and K(i,j) refer to the plain-text and the key, respectively. As can be observed in (19.6), the 
state only depends on one byte of the plain-text and one byte of the key.  
Although an attack on such a function can be addressed, it is difficult to discriminate 
between the true hypothesis and the false hypothesis, since the bit-wise exclusive-OR 
operator is linear. Consequently, it is expected that the correlations obtained for those 
hypotheses that have a similar Hamming weight will also be quite similar. Table 19.2 
shows the result for the correlation when an attack over byte 1 of the key is performed. 
The maximum correlation is obtained for the real key (211) and corresponds to ρ = 0.6692. 
However, it is also observed that such a value is very close to other correlations obtained 
for key hypotheses that have identical or similar HWs. 
The function ShiftRows only moves the bytes of state, but without performing any 
operation between them. Thus, any attack on this function is conceptually identical to an 
attack on AddRoundKey. 
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Table 19.2.Maximum correlations obtained when attacking function AddRoundKey.  
Key hypothesis and Hamming weight (HW) Max correlation 
209 HW(11010001) = 4 0.6282 
210 HW(11010010) = 4 0.6002 
211 HW(11010011) = 5 0.6692 
196 HW(11000011) = 4 0.6545 
148 HW(10010011) = 4 0.6236 
 
The output of function SubBytes is widely used as a target in SCAs analysis, because the 
non-linearity of such a function makes its output very different for key hypotheses having 
similar HWs. Its definition can be found in [2], and it will be represented by SBOX, as 
follows: 
 ܵݐ஻ሺ௜,௝ሻ 	ൌ 	ܵܤܱܺሺܵݐோሺ௜,௝ሻሻ, (19.7) 
where StR(i,j) and StB(i,j) refer to the value of matrix state at the output of ShiftRows and 
SubBytes, respectively. It can be demonstrated that the elements of matrix state StB(i,j) only 
depend on one byte of the key, and therefore only a reduced number of  hypotheses must 
be guessed. Table 19.3 represents the value of the correlation for several keys. As can be 
seen, the maximum correlation is given for the true key (ρ = 0.8143) and is clearly 
identifiable (one order of magnitude) even against those keys whose HWs are quite 
similar. 
Table 19.3. Maximum correlations obtained when attacking the output of function SubBytes.  
Key hypothesis Max correlation 
209 HW(11010001) = 4 0.0632 
210 HW(11010010) = 4 0.0747 
211 HW(11010011) = 5 0.8143 
196 HW(11000011) = 4 0.0591 
148 HW(10010011) = 4 0.0729 
 
After the calculation of function MixColumns in the first round, each value of the matrix 
state depends on 4 bytes of the key. This means that the number of possible keys to be 
guessed for predicting the theoretical model is 232. The Mixcolumns operation is applied 
on the four columns of the matrix state and it is defined as:  
 
ۉ
ۈ
ۇ
ܵݐெሺ௜,ଵሻ
ܵݐெሺ௜,ଶሻ
ܵݐெሺ௜,ଷሻ
ܵݐெሺ௜,ସሻی
ۋ
ۊ	ൌ 	൮
2 3 1 1
1 2 3 1
1 1 2 3
3 1 1 2
൲ ൉
ۉ
ۈ
ۇ
ܵݐ஻ሺ௜,ଵሻ
ܵݐ஻ሺ௜,ଶሻ
ܵݐ஻ሺ௜,ଷሻ
ܵݐ஻ሺ௜,ସሻی
ۋ
ۊ, (19.8) 
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where StB(i,j) and StM(i,j) represent the bytes of state at the output of SubBytes and 
MixColumns, respectively. From (19.8), it can be concluded that the first byte of state can 
be evaluated as: 
 ܵݐெሺଵ,ଵሻ 	ൌ 	2 ൉ ܵݐ஻ሺଵ,ଵሻ ⊕	3 ൉ ܵݐ஻ሺଵ,ଶሻ ⊕ ܵݐ஻ሺଵ,ଷሻ ⊕ ܵݐ஻ሺଵ,ସሻ. (19.9) 
Taking into account that the attacker has full control over the plain-text L., Pan et al. in 
[5] proposed the use of a plain-text in which all of its bytes are identical, except the byte 
that is the target of the attack. Assuming that in Eq.(19.9) such a byte is StB(1,4), then it is 
satisfied that:  
 ܵݐெሺଵ,ଵሻ 	ൌ 	ܥ݋݊ݏݐܽ݊ݐ ⊕ ܵݐ஻ሺଵ,ସሻ. (19.10) 
Note that in (19.10), the expression of StM(1,1) is equivalent to masking the input byte StM(1,1) 
using a non-variable constant mask. Masking is only an effective technique if the mask 
changes its value randomly. Thus, although the value of the correlation would be affected, 
the output of function MixColumns will be vulnerable in an identical way as it is function 
SubBytes.  
In round 2, the key is completely scattered in such a way that any byte of the matrix state 
depends on the 128 bits of the key. Thus, any attack in this round or the following rounds 
is equivalent to performing a brute force attack. 
19.3. The FAKING Countermeasure 
The basic idea of the proposed faking countermeasure is to carry out the encryption 
process using a false key. Such a false key is obtained by operating with an exclusive-OR 
operator, the real key and a mask-key that is randomly chosen: 
 ܭ݁ݕி஺௄ாሺ௜,௝ሻ 	ൌ 	ܭ݁ݕோா஺௅ሺ௜,௝ሻ ⊕ ܭ݁ݕெ஺ௌ௄ሺ௜,௝ሻ. (19.11) 
In (19.11), KeyFAKE  refers to the false key, KeyREAL is the true key and KeyMASK is the key-
mask. All of the keys are organized as a matrix of 4×4 bytes in such a way that they can 
be properly operated with the state. As the operations of the AES 128-bit algorithm are 
performed using the false key, and no additional countermeasures are taken, then any SCA 
analysis will lead to revealing the false key [9]. Fig. 19.2 shows the block diagram for 
implementing the faking countermeasure.  
Note that, the real and the expanded keys are both masked with KeyMASK, so that in any 
round the false key is used for processing function AddRoundKey. Afterwards, the 
encryption follows the usual steps for processing the rest of the functions included in the 
standard AES128-bit algorithm. Obviously, although the system is effectively protected, 
if no additional actions are taken then the plain-text will be incorrectly encrypted with the 
false key. Then, to obtain the expected results the process should be reverted at some 
point. Functions described in Fig. 19.2 as SboxTrans and MixColumns are included to 
remove the faking countermeasure before a new round is started.  
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Fig. 19.2. Implementation of the faking countermeasure applied on the AES128-bit 
encryption algorithm. 
Let State(i,j) be the output of function ShiftRows, then the effect of the non-linear function 
SubBytes over the matrix state will be:  
 ܵݐ௕ሺ௜,௝ሻ 	ൌ 	ܵܤܱܺ ቀܵݐ௥ሺ௜,௝ሻቁ 	ൌ 	ܵܤܱܺ൫ܭ݁ݕி஺௄ாሺ௜,௝ሻ ⊕ ܵݐܽݐ݁ሺ௜,௝ሻ൯. (19.12) 
By substituting (19.11) in (19.12), and developing the result in terms of the output that 
would be obtained if the real key was used, (19.12) can be expressed as:  
 
ܵݐ௕ሺ௜,௝ሻ 	ൌ 	ܵܤܱܺ൫ܭ݁ݕோா஺௅ሺ௜,௝ሻ ⊕ ܭ݁ݕெ஺ௌ௄ሺ௜,௝ሻ ⊕ ܵݐܽݐ݁ሺ௜,௝ሻ൯
ܵݐ௕ሺ௜,௝ሻ 	ൌ 	ܵܤܱܺ൫ܭ݁ݕோா஺௅ሺ௜,௝ሻ ⊕ ܵݐܽݐ݁ሺ௜,௝ሻ൯ ⊕ ܵݐ௕்ோ஺ேௌሺ௜,௝ሻ
ܵݐ௕ሺ௜,௝ሻ 	ൌ 	 ܵݐ௕ோா஺௅	ሺ௜,௝ሻ ⊕ ܵݐ௕்ோ஺ேௌሺ௜,௝ሻ
. (19.13) 
Note that, the output of SubBytes can be obtained by operating with an exclusive-OR, the 
matrix state encrypted with ܭ݁ݕோா஺௅ሺ௜,௝ሻ  and a new matrix denoted as ܵݐ௕்ோ஺ேௌሺ௜,௝ሻ , 
which represents the output of SboxTrans (see Fig. 19.2). 
Finally, the result of (19.13) is processed by using function MixColumns. This function 
operates in the Galois finite field GF(28) and it only includes additions as products. An 
interesting property of such an algebraic structure is that it satisfies the distributive 
property of multiplication with respect to the addition, and thus:  
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 ܣ ൉ ሺܤ ൅ ܥሻ 	ൌ 	ܣ ൉ ܤ ൅ ܣ ൉ ܥ. (19.14 
Using (19.13) and (19.14) it can be found that: 
 
ۉ
ۈ
ۇ
ܵݐெሺ௜,ଵሻ
ܵݐெሺ௜,ଶሻ
ܵݐெሺ௜,ଷሻ
ܵݐெሺ௜,ସሻی
ۋ
ۊ	ൌ 	൮
2 3 1 1
1 2 3 1
1 1 2 3
3 1 1 2
൲ ൉
ۉ
ۈ
ۇ
ܵݐ௕ோா஺௅	ሺ௜,௝ሻ ൅ ܵݐ௕்ோ஺ேௌሺ௜,௝ሻ
ܵݐ௕ோா஺௅	ሺ௜,௝ሻ ൅ ܵݐ௕்ோ஺ேௌሺ௜,௝ሻ
ܵݐ௕ோா஺௅	ሺ௜,௝ሻ ൅ ܵݐ௕்ோ஺ேௌሺ௜,௝ሻ
ܵݐ௕ோா஺௅	ሺ௜,௝ሻ ൅ ܵݐ௕்ோ஺ேௌሺ௜,௝ሻی
ۋ
ۊ. (19.15) 
Afterward, the distributive propertyis developed: 
 
ۉ
ۈ
ۇ
ܵݐெሺ௜,ଵሻ
ܵݐெሺ௜,ଶሻ
ܵݐெሺ௜,ଷሻ
ܵݐெሺ௜,ସሻی
ۋ
ۊ	ൌ 	൮
2 3 1 1
1 2 3 1
1 1 2 3
3 1 1 2
൲ ൉
ۉ
ۈ
ۇ
ܵݐ௕ோா஺௅ሺ௜,௝ሻ
ܵݐ௕ோா஺௅ሺ௜,௝ሻ
ܵݐ௕ோா஺௅ሺ௜,௝ሻ
ܵݐ௕ோா஺௅ሺ௜,௝ሻی
ۋ
ۊ ൅ ൮
2 3 1 1
1 2 3 1
1 1 2 3
3 1 1 2
൲ ൉ 
 
ۉ
ۈ
ۇ
ܵݐ௕்ோ஺ேௌሺ௜,௝ሻ
ܵݐ௕்ோ஺ேௌሺ௜,௝ሻ
ܵݐ௕்ோ஺ேௌሺ௜,௝ሻ
ܵݐ௕்ோ஺ேௌሺ௜,௝ሻی
ۋ
ۊ. (19.16) 
The conclusion is that: 
 ܵݐܯ 	ൌ 	ܯ݅ݔܥ݋݈ݑ݉݊ݏ	ሺܵݐ௕ோா஺௅ሻ ⊕ܯ݅ݔܥ݋݈ݑ݉݊ݏ	ሺܵݐ௕்ோ஺ேௌሻܵݐܯ 	ൌ 	 ܵݐܯோா஺௅ ⊕ ܵݐܯ்ோ஺ேௌ , (19.17) 
Where StM is the output of function MixColumns, StM REAL is the output of function 
MixColumns if it was processed with the true key, and StM TRANS is a masking matrix that 
will be used at the end of each round. 
Additionally, as the AES algorithm is executed in several rounds, the effects of the faking 
countermeasure should be reverted for each round. Thus, matrix STM TRANS, defined in 
(19.14), should be calculated in order to neutralize such an effect, since 
 ܵݐெ ⊕ ܵݐெܴܶܣܰܵ 	ൌ 	 ܵݐெܴܧܣܮ ⊕ ܵݐெܴܶܣܰܵ ⊕ ܵݐெܴܶܣܰܵ 	ൌ 	ܵݐெܴܧܣܮ. (19.18) 
On the other hand, matrix STM TRANS could be obtained by applying function MixColumns 
over matrix Stb TRANS, which can by deduced by using (19.13) as:  
 
ܵݐ௕்ோ஺ேௌሺ௜,௝ሻ 	ൌ 	 ܵݐ௕ோா஺௅ሺ௜,௝ሻ ⊕ ܵݐ௕ሺ௜,௝ሻ
ܵݐ௕்ோ஺ேௌሺ௜,௝ሻ 	ൌ 	ܵܤܱܺ൫ܭ݁ݕோா஺௅ሺ௜,௝ሻ ⊕ ܵݐܽݐ݁ሺ௜,௝ሻ൯ ⊕ ܾܵሺ௜,௝ሻ
. (19.19) 
by substituting (19.12) in (19.19): 
 ܵݐ௕்ோ஺ேௌሺ௜,௝ሻ 	ൌ 	ܵܤܱܺ൫ܭ݁ݕோா஺௅ሺ௜,௝ሻ ⊕ ܵݐܽݐ݁ሺ௜,௝ሻ൯ ⊕ 
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 ⊕ܵܤܱܺ൫ܭ݁ݕி஺௄ாሺ௜,௝ሻ ⊕ ܵݐܽݐ݁ሺ௜,௝ሻ൯. (19.20) 
Since elements of state are bytes, the 256 possible values for SbTRANS can be pre-calculated 
forming a table of 256 elements named SBOXTRANS. For calculating such a table, the 
following substitution is proposed:  
 ݒ݈ܽ	 ൌ 	ܭ݁ݕி஺௄ா ⊕ ܵݐܽݐ݁. (19.21) 
By using (19.11), Eq. (19.20) could be generalized for any value of the elements of state, 
as follows:  
 ܵܤ்ܱܺோ஺ேௌሺݒ݈ܽሻ 	ൌ 	ܵܤܱܺሺݒ݈ܽ ⊕ ܭ݁ݕெ஺ௌ௄ሻ ⊕ ܵܤܱܺሺݒ݈ܽሻ. (19.22) 
The use of this expression allows to calculate all the elements of SBOXTRANS by using the 
pseudocode shown in (19.23). Finally, a suitable value for a specific input could be 
calculated in a similar way to that which is performed when searching in SBOX during the 
execution of function SubBytes included in AES. 
݂݋ݎ	݆	 ൌ 	0	ݐ݋	255
					ܵܤ்ܱܺோ஺ேௌሺ݆ሻ 	ൌ 	ܵܤܱܺሺ݆ ⊕ ܭ݁ݕெ஺ௌ௄ሻ ⊕ ܵܤܱܺሺ݆ሻ݊݁ݔݐ	݆
												(19.23)  
19.3.1. Added Vulnerabilities 
It is necessary to analyze if the real implementation of the faking countermeasure adds 
itself new vulnerabilities that can be used to reveal the true key. Note that, the application 
of SCA analysis allows to find the false key KeyFAKE. So that, if the attacker does focus its 
target on revealing the key-mask KeyMASK, then it would be easy to find KeyREAL just by 
using (19.11). There are two weak points in the implementation presented in Fig. 19.2, 
which can be used to reveal KeyREAL. 
19.3.1.1. Second Order Attack 
A second order attack between the output of functions SboxTrans and SubBytes can be 
used to find KeyREAL. The model to be used is based on the combination, by means of an 
exclusive-OR operator, between the output of SubBytes (19.13) and the output of 
SboxTrans (19.19): 
 ܵݐ௕ሺ௜,௝ሻ ⊕ ܵܤ்ܱܺோ஺ேௌሺ௜,௝ሻ 	ൌ 	ܵܤܱܺ൫ܭ݁ݕோா஺௅ሺ௜,௝ሻ ⊕ ܵݐܽݐ݁ሺ௜,௝ሻ൯. (19.24) 
In the first round, the state corresponds directly to the plain-text. Additionally, SBOX is 
defined by the algorithm, so that both data are known by the attacker and can be used to 
perform SCA analysis for revealing KeyREAL. 
The power consumption can be pre-processed by using the function defined in (19.3), 
being the pair (Cti, Ctk), the power consumed at the output of functions SubBytes and 
SboxTrans, respectively. 
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Fig. 19.3 shows the result of a theoretical second order attack following this procedure 
and which is performed over the first byte of the key. It can be observed as the obtained 
correlations are quite reduced, but the maximum is perfectly distinguishable among the 
rest of the values and it is in accordance with the real key. 
 
Fig. 19.3. Simulation of a second order attack based on the correlation. 
19.3.1.2. Attack on the Output of SboxTrans 
Eq. (19.20) depends only on the state, the false key and the real key. Note that, if both 
function SBOX and the KEYFAKE are known by the attacker and then it is possible to 
perform SCA on SboxTrans to reveal the real key. 
19.3.2. Protecting the StM TRANS Array 
The solution for avoiding the attacks presented above is to protect the matrix StMTRANS 
using a random mask. Such a matrix is combined, by using an exclusive-OR operator, 
with a mask that is changing its bytes at every encryption cycle.  
Masking StMTRANS has a significant effect on function MixColumns, since this function 
operates over different bytes that are located in several rows. It is not recommended to use 
the same mask for masking the 16 bytes of state, since the protection can be removed 
momentarily when one of the exclusive-OR operations involved in Mixcolumns is 
performed. In [4], it is proposed to use different masks for each row of state, in order to 
protect the integrity of data when Mixcolumns is executed. 
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Then, the values of bytes included in the mask are randomly generated for every 
encryption (decryption) cycle. Such values form a matrix named MTJ  and defined as: 
 ܯ ௃ܶ 	ൌ 	൮
݉଴ ݉଴ ݉଴ ݉଴݉ଵ ݉ଵ ݉ଵ ݉ଵ݉ଶ ݉ଶ ݉ଶ ݉ଶ݉ଷ ݉ଷ ݉ଷ ݉ଷ
൲, (19.25) 
where [m0, m1, m2, m3] represent the mask values for every row of matrix  StM TRANS. 
If matrix MTJ is included, then the calculation of StM TRANS would be: 
 ܵݐ௕்ோ஺ேௌሺ௜,௝ሻ 	ൌ 	 ܵݐ௕ோா஺௅ሺ௜,௝ሻ ⊕ ܵݐ௕ሺ௜,௝ሻ ⊕ ܯ ௃ܶ. (19.26) 
Note that, the system is protected since now a random term that is unknown by the attacker 
is included. Besides, it should be pointed out that this random term cannot be cancelled 
by means of a second order attack, since it is only applied on function SboxTrans.  
If in this new scenario a second order attack is performed, the results shown in Fig. 19.4 
demonstrate the effectiveness of the protection that is added by the mask. It is impossible 
to distinguish between the real hypothesis and the false hypothesis that correspond to the 
true key. 
 
Fig. 19.4. Second order attack including masking. 
Obviously, before starting a new round, the effect of masking should be removed in order 
to perform the encryption process correctly. The cancelation matrix is named MTK. 
After the application of function SboxTrans, Eq.(19.27) is obtained 
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 ܵݐ௕்ோ஺ேௌሺ௜,௝ሻ ⊕ ܯܶܬ. (19.27) 
Afterwards, function MixColumns is applied to (19.27), obtaining: 
 ܯ݅ݔܥ݋݈ݑ݉݊ݏ ቀܵݐ௕்ோ஺ேௌሺ௜,௝ሻ ⊕ ܯܶܬቁ = 
 ൌ 	ܯ݅ݔܥ݋݈ݑ݉݊ݏ ቀܵݐ௕்ோ஺ேௌሺ௜,௝ሻቁ ⊕ܯ݅ݔܥ݋݈ݑ݉݊ݏ൫ܯܶܬ൯. (19.28) 
From (19.28), it can be deduced that the elements of matrix MTK can be calculated by 
using expression (19.29): 
 ܯ ௄ܶ ൌ 	൮
2 3 1 1
1 2 3 1
1 1 2 3
3 1 1 2
൲ ൉ ൮
݉଴ ݉଴ ݉଴ ݉଴݉ଵ ݉ଵ ݉ଵ ݉ଵ݉ଶ ݉ଶ ݉ଶ ݉ଶ݉ଷ ݉ଷ ݉ଷ ݉ଷ
൲ ൌ 
 = ൮
݉௔ ݉௔ ݉௔ ݉௔݉௕ ݉௕ ݉௕ ݉௕݉௖ ݉௖ ݉௖ ݉௖݉ௗ ݉ௗ ݉ௗ ݉ௗ
൲ (19.29) 
Finally, Fig. 19.5 shows the complete structure of the system, including the random 
number generator used to calculate matrix MTJ, and the operations needed to perform the 
cancelation of masks before starting a new round. 
 
Fig. 19.5. AES algorithm structure with faking countermeasure and masking protection. 
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19.3.3. Computational Cost 
Additional operations included to perform the faking countermeasure increase the 
processing time. These operations can be divided into three groups: 
 Those operations that are carried out at the beginning of the encryption process for 
changing KEYREAL or KEYMASK; 
 Operations that are performed at every encryption cycle; 
 Operations made at every round of the algorithm. 
In the first group, only the masking of the expanded key is involved. The impact of this 
operation is not very important, since the execution time is distributed among the plain-
texts that are processed using the same key. 
The operations included in the second group are intended for calculating matrix MTJ and 
matrix MTK.Eq. (19.27) is applied on the 16 bytes that form the state, so that it is necessary 
to calculate 16 SBOXTRANS tables for calculating SboxTrans. In order to minimize the 
impact of these operations, it is possible to perform their calculation concurrently with the 
communication of the device when reading or writing the original and cipher texts, 
respectively. 
The third group of operations is necessary for calculating matrix StM TRANS. Since these 
operations are made in each round, they have an important impact on the execution time. 
As the key is completely scattered after round 2, and then performing a successful SCA 
is almost impossible, the time could be reduced if after round 2 the countermeasure is 
disabled (the countermeasure should be activated again after round 9, because SCA 
analysis could be focus on the last rounds [5]).  
19.4. Experimental Results 
This section shows the experimental results obtained when a software implementation of 
the proposed countermeasure is included in the AES 128-bit encryption algorithm. The 
execution is performed on a 32-bit soft-core Microblaze V8.10 microprocessor provided 
by Xilinx. In [10] it is shown that it is possible to undertake a successful SCA analysis on 
this microprocessor. The system was implemented on a Virtex-5 FPGA clocked at  
24 MHz [3]. The current traces were captured using a Tektronic CT-1 current probe 
connected to an Agilent DSO1024A oscilloscope.  
The presented results are based on the analysis of the correlation and the attack proposed 
in [11], based on the differences-in-means. In order to observe the efficiency of the 
proposal, both results are shown when the countermeasure is activated and disabled. The 
target of the attack was focussed on function SubBytes, when byte 0 of the key is processed 
in the first round. The value chosen for KEYREAL is 134, KEYMASK is 85, and therefore we 
take into account that in  (19.27) KEYFAKE is 211. 
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The upper traces in Fig. 19.6 shows SCA analysis based on the value of the correlation 
when the countermeasure is disabled. Clearly, the maximum value for such correlation is 
about 0.8 and it corresponds with the true key. When the countermeasure is activated 
(lower traces of Fig. 19.6), the maximum correlation is given for the false key. The true 
key is completely protected and has a very low correlation that is non-distinguishable 
between the rests of the keys. 
 
Fig. 19.6. Correlation attack. Upper traces correspond to an unprotected system; lower traces  
are obtained by activating the faking countermeasure. 
Fig. 19.7 shows the values of the correlation against an increasing number of captured 
traces. The SCA is able to reveal the key with only 50 traces, independently, if the system 
is protected or if the countermeasure is disabled.  
The attack based on differences-in-means was performed following the proposal of  
R. Lumbiarres in [11], which is based partially on the original publication of P. Kocher in 
[1]. Results shown in Fig. 19.8 again demonstrate that the system is completely protected 
when the faking countermeasure is activated by revealing a false key. 
Generally, any countermeasure leads to increasing the number of hardware resources 
and/or the total execution time. Table 19.4 shows the penalty generated due to the 
inclusion of the proposed countermeasure. The execution time is increased by about  
39 %, whereas, in accordance with this value, the throughput is reduced by 28 %. On the 
other hand, the memory needed to execute the process is also increased due to the extra 
memory required to store the 16 SBOXTRANS tables. Compared with other implementations, 
these penalties are quite acceptable. For instance, a masked implementation of an AES 
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128-bit algorithm that is executed on a microprocessor is also presented in [4]. The 
difference in the execution time between the non-protected and masked implementations 
was doubled. 
 
Fig. 19.7. Correlation attack over an increasing number of traces. Upper traces correspond  
to a non-protected system; lower traces are obtained by activating the faking countermeasure. 
 
Fig. 19.8. Differences-in-means. Upper traces correspond to a non-protected system; lower traces 
are obtained by activating the faking countermeasure. 
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Table 19.4. Execution time and memory used.  
Parameter Non-protected Fake protected Improvement 
Execution time 1.14 ms 1.59 ms 39 % 
Time expended in pre-
calculating the tables 
SBOXTRANS 
---- 1.90 ms --- 
Throughput 112 kb/s 80kb/s -28 % 
Memory needed for 
executing the algorithm 11770 bytes 19094 bytes 62 % 
19.5. Conclusions 
The proposed countermeasure conceals the true key by presenting a strong correlation 
related to a false key. Experimental results showed that the method is effective when either 
the correlation or differences-in-means attacks are performed.  
When compared with a non-protected system, the execution time and the memory needed 
to execute the encryption algorithm are increased. However, such an increase is lower 
than the penalty related to previous proposals made by different authors.  
Another interesting feature of the faking countermeasure is that its particular structure 
allows to include additional actions that increase the difficulty to find the true key. Thus, 
it is possible to modify the real key without introducing any modification in the false key. 
Then, the maximum correlation is the same although the encrypting key was changed. 
Also, it is possible to introduce modifications into the false key, while keeping the value 
of the real key. In this case, the attacker may conclude that the encryption key has changed.  
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